In part 2 of our working history series written by Dr. Alhaji in 2008, we revisit the concept “Energy Security” with a focus on Asia. As energy demand continues to rise in China, India, and Japan, the concept of “energy security” has taken center stage in policy discussions. However, the application of this largely Western construct in the Asian context has led to contradictions between stated goals and actual policies. These contradictions raise fundamental questions about the effectiveness of current energy security strategies and their broader implications for global energy stability.
Since the article was written back in 2008 Asia has significantly revised its energy security policies in line with Dr. Alhaji's suggestions. In recent years, China, India, and Japan have significantly refined their approaches to energy security, moving beyond earlier contradictions to implement more cohesive and strategic policies.
China
China has emerged as a global leader in renewable energy development, achieving its 2030 renewable energy target by mid-2024, six years ahead of schedule. This rapid advancement underscores China's commitment to reducing its reliance on fossil fuels and enhancing energy security through sustainable means. However, to meet its vast and growing electricity demands, China continues to expand coal-fired power generation, reflecting a pragmatic approach to balance immediate energy needs with long-term sustainability goals.
India
India has proactively addressed its energy security by passing legislation to boost domestic oil and gas exploration, aiming to reduce its heavy reliance on imported crude oil, which accounted for nearly 90% of consumption from April to December 2024. The new law seeks to attract more investments by stabilizing policies, allowing international arbitration, and extending lease periods. Additionally, India has signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States to enhance collaboration on supply chains for critical minerals essential for electric vehicles and clean energy, marking a significant step towards bolstering its energy security and supporting economic growth.
Japan
Japan has revised its energy policy to maximize nuclear power usage, aiming to increase nuclear energy's share from 8.5% to 20% and renewables from 22.9% to 40-50% by 2040. This shift addresses growing electricity demand and decarbonization goals, marking a significant change from the phaseout policy post-Fukushima disaster in 2011. The policy includes restarting existing reactors, building new ones, and developing next-generation energy sources, reflecting Japan's commitment to a diversified and secure energy strategy.
Collectively, these developments indicate a maturation in the concept of energy security among major Asian economies, with policies now reflecting a more integrated and realistic approach to balancing energy independence, sustainability, and economic growth.
How can they explain this impressive economic performance despite record dependence on oil imports?
Asian Countries And the Concept of “Energy Security” (Part 2/5)
Energy security “fever” has reached China, India, and Japan. Unfortunately, it seems that those “eastern” countries do not know the meaning of this imported “western” concept. The importation of this one-size-fits-all concept has led to contradictions among policies on one hand and between policies and their objectives on the other. These contradictions have in turn led to policy failures, rendered the concept of energy security hollow, and jeopardized world energy security in the process.
Energy demand in Asia, especially in China and India, has increased substantially in the last decade. Although India and China are oil producers, their domestic production has not been able to keep up with the growing demand. The result is a growing gap that has to be covered by imports of oil, natural gas, and LNG. Since oil has dominated energy imports in recent years, oil dependence dominates the “energy security” debate in those countries.
To enhance energy security, Asian countries have concentrated mainly on “filling the energy gap” by securing upstream oil contracts around the world, encouraging domestic exploration for oil and gas, exploring the possibility of transporting natural gas via pipelines from Iran, the Caspian, Russia, and Myanmar, and securing long-term LNG contracts with Qatar, Iran, and Algeria. At the same time, government officials in several Asian countries have started talking about the “energy security” of their nations. Some Indian officials’ statements go so far as to call for elimination of energy dependence.
Policy Contradictions
If the officials of those Asian countries are truly worried about “energy dependency” and “energy security”, then they have to answer the following question:
Why do they make such dependency legal and binding by signing exploration and production contracts with some oil producing countries?
Why do they sign contracts with the least secure countries in the world?
How does investment in the upstream sector of some unstable oil producing countries that are as far away as Venezuela enhance the energy security of these Asian countries?
How does the security of oil supplies differ from the security of the investments of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese oil companies in the oil producing countries, some of which are known for their political instability?
Why was the visit of the Saudi monarch to China and India termed historic by the same officials who are worried about “energy dependency”?
Ignorance, Political Posturing Or Both?
The contradictions between calls for “energy independence” of some Chinese, Indian, and Japanese government officials and the actions of their government-owned oil companies indicate that most politicians do not know what energy security is, which smacks of political posturing. Even if they are aware of its meaning, these countries lack the measures needed to assess and measure energy security. In most cases, they lack the timely data required to build such measures.
If it was not “ignorance” or “political posturing,” can officials explain why they are worried about “dependence” on oil supplies from the Middle East? Can Indian officials, in particular, explain why dependence on their historic and geographic partners in the Gulf is “dangerous”? Can they explain why, for example, the impact of 30% dependence on oil imports is different from 60%? Those in China and India who are worried about the increasing dependence on oil imports must answer the following questions:
How can they explain the economic miracles of Japan and Germany despite their 100% dependence on foreign oil?
How can they explain the impressive high rates of economic growth in their countries in recent years despite record-high oil prices?
How can they explain this impressive economic performance despite record dependence on oil imports?
And one more question: should the Saudis lead the way in eliminating “dependence” on Chinese, Indian, and Japanese products?
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This article provided a general framework in which it identifies six dimensions of energy security. The critical problem is the lack of timely data to measure and assess energy security situation in most consuming countries. Without measurement and assessment, decision makers cannot make the correct policy recommendations to avoid an energy crisis.
While energy independence might improve some aspects of energy security, it does not shield the country from energy shocks. The petroleum market is global. Any shortage in any part of the world will increase petroleum prices worldwide. Therefore, policy makers in the consuming countries can enhance energy security by fostering interdependence rather than agonizing about dependence.
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About the Author:
At the time of writing (2008) Dr Alhajji was president of the Ohio-based Energy Security Analysts, LLC. The article draws on a chapter entitled “India’s Energy Security: Concepts and Measures” in “West Asia in Turmoil,” Published by The Institute for Defense Studies Analysis, New Delhi, India, 2007. The article has been reprinted with the permission of MEES.